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Abstract
In an electronic voting procedure, mixing networks are used to ensure anonymity of the casted
votes. Each node of the network re-encrypts the input and randomly permutes it in a process
named shuffle, and must prove that the process was applied honestly. State-of-the-art clas-
sical proofs achieve logarithmic communication complexity on N (the number of votes to be
shuffled) but they are based on assumptions which are weak against quantum computers. To
maintain security in a post-quantum scenario, new proofs are based on different mathematical
assumptions, such as lattice-based problems. Nonetheless, the best lattice-based protocols
to ensure verifiable shuffling have linear communication complexity on N . In this thesis we
propose the first sub-linear post-quantum proof for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we
have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from [BBC+18] and Beneš





electronic voting, lattice-based cryptography, RLWE-encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, arith-
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1. Introduction
In a society like the current one, electronic procedures are becoming more numerous, important
and sophisticated. Online shopping, bank management, or even watching our favourite series
in a video on demand streaming service are activities that today can be carried out almost
at any time and anywhere with our mobile phone. All these activities have something in
common: we wish to keep our personal information private. One of these processes is electronic
voting, which is becoming more and more a reality. This kind of voting could bring several
advantages compared to traditional voting. Electronic voting is less expensive, it requires of less
infrastructure, the results are obtained quicker and the process is way much simpler. However,
to become a real alternative, it requires to be as reliable as standard voting. Hence the
importance of cryptography, since it may allow security, privacy and integrity to be guaranteed
in these processes.
The purpose of cryptography is to permit confidential communication between two parties
through an insecure channel. That is, it allows to send a message in such a way that everyone
can read it, but only the involved people can understand it. To achieve this, it uses mathemat-
ical problems that are difficult to solve unless some piece of information is known. Initially, for
two parties to communicate it was necessary that they previously agreed on a secret key, which
gave rise to private key cryptography. This cryptographic paradigm involved many difficulties,
principally regarding the necessity of large keys. In 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman
created a protocol to share information without the need of the previous agreement on a secret
key [DH76]. In this way, they made possible the so-called public key cryptography, in which
each party has a private key and a public key, and that solves many of the issues that private
key cryptography had.
The new paradigm of programming based on quantum physics has great potential in terms
of computational power, and therefore it might suppose a threat to current cryptography,
since some problems which remained almost insolvable for years may become not so difficult
for a quantum computer. The objective of this thesis is to present a new protocol useful in
electronic voting, and prove its security against a quantum adversary.
1.1 Computational complexity
When studying the various problems it is especially interesting to know the cost of resources
of a computer such as time and memory space that are required to run algorithms that solve
each problem. Specifically, computational complexity theory aims to make a classification of
the problems according to the inherent difficulty of each problem, as well as to discern which
problems can be solved by a computer and which cannot.
The complexity of an algorithm usually varies according to the size n of the input. Let
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n 7→ f (n) be the positive function that maps the size of the input to the maximum (or average)
amount of resources needed to solve the problem over all possible n. Then f is called the
worst-case (or respectively, average-case) complexity of the algorithm.
For theoretical purposes, it is specially relevant the asymptotic behaviour of the function
when n goes to infinity. This behaviour is usually expressed using the big-O notation. We say
that f (n) ∈ O(g(n)) if there exists ε > 0 and n0 such that for all n ≥ n0: f (n) ≤ ε · g(n).
Informally, this means that g grows at least at the same speed than f . For instance, if an
algorithm runs in f (n) = 4n3 + n + log(n), as n grows, the n3 term dominates the others and
the constant 4 becomes irrelevant. Therefore, we have f (n) ∈ O(n3). This notation allows to
classify algorithms according to their complexity, choosing functions to be the representative
of the different asymptotic behaviours. Table 1 shows some of the complexity classes that will
appear throughout the thesis, in strict increasing order by set inclusion.
Notation Name Other information
O(1) Constant
O((log(n))c) Polylogarithmic For c > 0
O(nc) Fractional power For 0 < c < 1
O(n) Linear
O(n log(n)) Quasilinear
O(nc) Polynomial For c > 1. Also denoted poly(n)
O(cn) Exponential For c > 1
Table 1: Complexity classes.
It is also commonly used the big-Omega notation, which represents the opposite of the
big-O. A function f (n) ∈ Ω(g(n)) if and only if g(n) ∈ O(f (n)). In addition, it is possible to
define Θ(f (n)) = O(f (n)) ∩ Ω(f (n)).
It is important to distinguish between the complexity of an algorithm and the complexity
of a problem. The complexity of a problem refers to its inherent difficulty, which may not be
known. In computer science, by convention, a problem is considered easy to solve if there is
knowledge of a polynomial-time algorithm that solves it.
Hence it is possible to classify problems according to their complexity. There are several
problem classes, but the most important ones are classes P and NP . A common miscon-
ception is to consider that P are the problems solved by a polynomial-time algorithm, while
NP are the ones whose best solution is exponential or worse. This is not exact, although is
close. Actually, the names P and NP refer to deterministic polynomial and non-deterministic
polynomial, respectively. This means that problems in P can be solved by a deterministic
polynomial-time Turing machine, and problems in NP can be solved by a non-deterministic
polynomial-time Turing machine. Informally, a deterministic Turing machine is equivalent to
standard deterministic algorithms, while a non-deterministic Turing machine is a theoretical
construction in which algorithms are allowed to execute some instructions at the same time.
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While it is obvious that P ⊆ NP , since deterministic machines are just a kind of non-
deterministic machines; a much more intriguing question, and one of the most important
problems in mathematics and computer science, is whether NP ⊆ P . There is a sub-class of
problems contained in NP called NP-complete, which has the particularity that finding just
one deterministic polynomial time solution for just one of these problems proves P = NP .
Nonetheless, this algorithm, if it exists, at the moment is not known and the problem P vs.
NP remains unsolved.
In cryptography it is very unusual to mathematically prove absolute security of applications.
Instead, the most common solution to this issue is to base security on the inherent hardness
of certain problems and assumptions such as P 6= NP .
1.2 Quantum computing
The basis of classic computing are bits, which may have a value of 0 or 1. Physically, they are
usually implemented using high or low electric potential on a wire. However, there are other
ways to implement the information of a bit. We can consider an hydrogen atom, for example,
and check if its electron is at its lowest energy level (fundamental state) or if its at a higher
level of energy (excited state), and encode each state with 0 or 1. We will use the bra-ket
notation |0〉 and |1〉 to represent these values. When considering this type of information
encoding, the quantum properties appear and they must be taken into account.
What makes quantum computation different from classical computation is that the electron
is in a linear superposition of both states, namely in a quantum state |ψ〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉,
where α, β ∈ C such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. This state |ψ〉 is called a qubit and it is the basis of
quantum computing. However, to read the value of a qubit we must perform a measurement,
which will return |0〉 with probability |α|2 and |1〉 with probability |β|2, and will cause the
qubit to collapse to the corresponding classical state.
We can consider states with more than one qubit, for instance the 2-qubit state |ψ〉 =
α00 |00〉+ α01 |01〉+ α10 |10〉+ α11 |11〉. If we have two qubits α |0〉+ β |1〉 and γ |0〉+ δ |1〉
we can consider the 2-qubit state formed by those 2 qubits using the tensor product to obtain
|ψ〉 = αγ |00〉 + αδ |01〉 + βγ |10〉 + βδ |11〉. This implies another important feature of
quantum physics, which is called entanglement. Notice that there are 2-qubit states such as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) that cannot be written as a product of two single states. Quantum
entanglement might have some really powerful applications in telecommunications and coding
theory, since two entangled qubits could be used to share information instantaneously between
them even if they are separated by millions of light years.
For our purposes, the relevance of quantum algorithms is that they are able to solve some
NP problems which are not known to be in P in polynomial time. Some of the most used
cryptographic applications have hypothetical security that relies on the hardness of problems
of this kind, such as the discrete logarithm or the factorization problem, which can be solved
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with Shor’s algorithm [Sho97]. Therefore, some cryptographic protocols may become insecure
in front of a quantum computer. At the present time no one has access to a sufficiently
powerful quantum computer to obtain encrypted data, but it is necessary to adapt as soon
as possible our cryptographic protocols to avoid these potential attacks, in order to achieve
long-term privacy. In fact, a malicious adversary might store the encrypted information until
it has access to a quantum computer and then proceed to recover this private data.
There are classical problems that are hard even for quantum computers, in the sense that
there is not knowledge of any quantum algorithm capable of solving any of them in polyno-
mial time. Usually, a quantum algorithm is able to solve this problems faster than classical
algorithms but still in exponential time Therefore, the security parameters should be estab-
lished taking quantum computing into account, to keep security. Post-quantum cryptography
is the branch that studies how to develop new applications based on these problems in order
to achieve security against quantum computers. One of the most promising families of post-
quantum problems are based in a mathematical construction called lattices. In this thesis we
will explain the main results about lattices and the problems derived from them which are
hypothetically resistant against quantum adversaries.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
In section 1 we introduce the general purpose of cryptography, we explain the theory of
computational complexity and we introduce the new paradigm based on quantum physics.
In section 2 we explain the notation used throughout the thesis. In section 3 we illustrate
the mathematical background of lattices and explain the main problems which are used in
cryptographic protocols given their assumed hardness against quantum computers. In section
4 we introduce the main cryptographic primitives such as public key encryption, commitment
schemes and zero-knowledge proofs with some useful examples. In section 5 we introduce
arithmetic circuits and show how to prove satisfiability in zero knowledge. In section 6 we
define a shuffle and we combine the previous sections to achieve the main objective of the
thesis: a new lattice-based zero knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle using
arithmetic circuit satisfiability. Finally, in section 7 we summarize the whole thesis and discuss
some possibilities for future work.
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2. Preliminaries
We denote vectors with boldface lower-case letters like a, matrices with boldface upper-case
letters like A. We represent A = [a1, ... , ak] the matrix whose i-th column is the vector ai.
The euclidean norm of an element a is ‖a‖2 = |a| if a ∈ Z or ‖a‖2 =
√∑









‖ai‖22. The standard inner product of two vectors a, b is 〈a, b〉 =
∑n
i=1 aibi .







largest eigenvalue of matrix A.
We write x
R← X when x is chosen uniformly at random from a set X , and x R← χ when
x is chosen according to the probability distribution χ. Given a deterministic algorithm A
we write y ← A(x) when A outputs y on input x . Similarly, if A is probabilistic, we write
y ← A(x ; r) when A outputs y on input x and randomness r , or y R← A(x), omitting the
explicit randomness for the sake of clarity. Henceforward, we refer to Probabilistic Polynomial
Time algorithm as PPT algorithm.
Given the function ρσ(x) = e
−x2









We can upper-bound the norm of x













2nσ | x R← Dnσ
]
< 2−n/4
Definition 2.1 (Negligible function). We call a non-negative function f : Z+ → R negligible
if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any nonzero polynomial:
∀c ∈ Z+ lim
λ→∞
f (λ)λ−c = 0
We denote the set of negligible functions over the variable λ as negl(λ).
Definition 2.2 (Overwhelming function). We say a function f is overwhelming if
1− f ∈ negl(λ)
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Whenever defining a cryptographic scheme, it will require a security parameter λ, which
will indicate the security of the scheme. In particular, we will ask for some probabilities to be
negligible over λ, thus when λ increases, the restrictions become stronger, and therefore the
sheme more secure. For this reason we will denote 1λ as the unary representation of λ. The
reason for taking the unary representation is to avoid using logarithms when doing calculations
with the size of λ, since the size of 1λ is precisely λ. For instance, if λ = 5 then 1λ = 11111.
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3. Lattices
3.1 Basic concepts
Definition 3.1 (Lattice). A lattice L is defined as a set of points in an n-dimensional space
(usually Rn) that verify these two conditions:
1. It is an additive subgroup:
• 0 ∈ L
• ∀x , y ∈ L : −x , x + y ∈ L.
2. It is discrete: for every x ∈ L, there is a neighbourhood of x in the base space such
that x is the only point in L.
In other words, a lattice is a set of points in an n-space with a periodic structure.
Henceforward we will always consider the real space Rn as the base space.
Lattices can be seen as vector spaces generated by a basis with the restriction that the
coefficients must be integers, instead of real values. Thus, we may consider lattices generated
by a basis in an analogous way as in usual vector spaces.
Definition 3.2 (Generated lattice). Given a set of k linearly independent vectors {b1, ... , bk} ⊂
Rn, the generated lattice is:




xibi : xi ∈ Z, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
= {Bx : x ∈ Zn} = L(B)
Where we have used the matrix notation B = [b1, ... , bk] ∈ Rk×n. We will say that the lattice
L(B) is an n-dimensional lattice of rank k generated by the basis {b1, ... , bk}. When k = n
the lattice is called a full-rank lattice. If not stated otherwise, we will only consider full-rank
lattices.
The basis of a lattice is not unique. In fact, every lattice can be generated by infinitely
many bases, and some of them may be better than others. In particular, if we consider an
unimodular matrix U (that is, an integer square matrix with determinant 1 or -1), then the
bases B and BU generate the same lattice.
Theorem 3.3. L(B1) = L(B2) if and only if B2 = B1U for some unimodular matrix U.
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Proof. Suppose L(B1) = L(B2). Then each of the columns bi of B2 is in L(B1). Hence,
exists an integer matrix U ∈ Zn×n such that B2 = B1U. Analogously, there is V ∈ Zn×n such
that B1 = B2V. Therefore B2 = B2VU and we get, taking determinants:
det(B2) = det(B2VU) = det(B2) det(V) det(U)
Therefore det(U) det(V) = 1. And given that U and V are integer matrices, we have det(U) =
±1.
Now suppose B2 = B1U, for some unimodular matrix U. Then, each column bi of B2 is
contained in L(B1), so L(B1) ⊆ L(B2). Also, since U−1 is also unimodular and B1 = B2U−1,
we get L(B2) ⊆ L(B1). In conclusion L(B1) = L(B2).
Notice that this implies that the absolute value of the determinant of a basis of a lattice
is an invariant of the lattice. Therefore we may define the following concept:
Definition 3.4 (Determinant of a lattice). The determinant of a lattice L = L(B) is:
∆(L) = |det(B)|
Now that it is clear that the same lattice can be generated by several bases, let us formally
state whether a basis is a ‘good’ one or a ‘bad’ one. We are interested in ‘small’ bases with
high ‘orthogonality’, which allow some cryptographic applications to have a higher chance of
success. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of orthogonality defect.





It is possible to consider this value normalized by taking the n-root: n
√
δ(B)
The orthogonality defect is 1 if and only if the basis B is orthogonal. If not, the defect
increases as the orthogonality of the basis decreases. However, given a bad basis of a lattice,
transforming it into a good basis is in general a difficult task. When n = 2 a gaussian
elimination provides a good basis and this method can be generalized to a n-dimensional
lattice using the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász algorithm presented in [LLL82], which applies gaussian
elimination to the elements of the basis two by two. Nevertheless, the length of the vectors
of the basis are far from optimal.
Several problems about lattices that will be used for cryptographic purposes involve the
search of small elements in a lattice. Hence, we introduce the concept of minimum of a lattice.
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Definition 3.6 (Minimum of a lattice). The minimum of a lattice λi(L) is the radius of the
smallest n-sphere centered in the origin containing at least i linearly independent vectors of
the lattice. In particular, λ1(L) is the minimum distance between two elements of the lattice,




Definition 3.7 (Dual of a lattice). Given a lattice L the dual lattice is defined as:
L∗ = {y ∈ Rn | 〈x , y〉 ∈ Z}
It can be seen that if B is a basis of a lattice L, then (B−1)T is a basis of the dual lattice
L∗
To make computers able to work with lattices, it is necessary to consider lattices modulo
an integer q. Hence, we introduce the concept of q-ary lattices.
Definition 3.8 (q-ary lattice). Given a (possibly prime) integer q, a lattice L is said to be
q-ary if it satisfies:
qZn ⊆ L ⊆ Zn
That is, the membership of x ∈ Rn in L is determined by x mod q. When L ⊂ Zn and q
is a multiple of ∆(L), the lattice L is a q-ary lattice. However, interesting q-ary lattices for
cryptography involve a q much smaller than the determinant of the lattice.
There are two ways to define q-ary lattices. Given a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , the rows of A
generate the lattice
Λq(A) = {y ∈ Zn | y = ATs mod q for some s ∈ Zm}
while the elements which are orthogonal modulo q to the rows of A generate the orthogonal
lattice
Λ⊥q (A) = {y ∈ Zn | Ay = 0 mod q}
It is important to notice that the matrix A is not a basis of these lattices.
And these lattices are dual of each other, up to normalization; namely Λ⊥q (A) = qλq(A)
∗
and Λq(A) = qΛ⊥q (A)
∗.
3.2 Lattice-based problems
Now we proceed to illustrate the main problems based in lattices. The assumed hardness of
these problems against quantum computers will be the key to ultimately design highly secure
cryptographic schemes, in principle capable to resist even quantum attacks.
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Definition 3.9 (Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (γ-SVP)). Given a basis B of a lattice
L(B) the Approximate Shortest Vector Problem γ-SVP, is to find a non-zero vector v ∈ L(B)
such that
‖v‖2 ≤ γ(n) · λ1(L(B))
The parameter γ is typically taken to be a function of the lattice dimension n, and is
the key of the hardness of γ-SVP. Observe the problem gets harder as γ gets smaller. When
γ = 1, the problem is called simply Shortest Vector Problem, and it has been proved to be
NP-hard. In the approximate case, some polynomial algorithms for basis reductions like the
L3 [LLL82] can find a solution when γ is large enough (γ ≈ 2Ω(n)), and some descendants
improved the algorithm to obtain solutions when γ ≈ 2Θ(n log log n/ log n). For γ ≈ poly(n) it is
believed that no PPT can solve this problem, since the best algorithms known either require
super-exponential 2Θ(n log n) time or exponential 2Θ(n) time and space.
Definition 3.10 (Approximate Closest Vector Problem (γ-CVP)). Given a basis B of a lattice
L(B) and a target vector t ∈ Rn the Approximate Closest Vector Problem γ-CVP, is to find
a vector u ∈ L(B) such that if v = arg min
w∈L(B)
‖t−w‖2 then
‖u− v‖2 ≤ γ(n) ‖t− v‖2
While the definition might look a bit confusing, the problem is just finding the vector
u ∈ L(B) which is closest to the target t ∈ Rn. Goldreich et al. proved in [GMSS99] that
hardness of the γ-CVP is at least the same as γ-SVP.
Definition 3.11 (Approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (γ-SIVP)). Given a
basis B of a lattice L(B), find n linearly independent vectors si ∈ L(B), where
‖si‖2 ≤ γ(n) · λn(L(B))
for all i .
Now we proceed to define one of the main problems about lattices, the Learning With
Errors Problem (LWE). This problem was first proposed by Regev in [Reg05] and it is in the
core of many post-quantum public key encryption schemes.
Let n, q integers, χσ a discrete probability distribution over Z (usually a Gaussian distri-
bution) with standard deviation σ and a secret vector s ∈ Znq.
Definition 3.12 (Learning With Errors Distribution). The LWE distribution Ls,χσ over Znq×Zq
is sampled by choosing a
R← Znq, e
R← χσ and outputting (a, b = 〈s, a〉+ e mod q).
Definition 3.13 (Search-LWE Problem). Given m independent samples (ai, bi)
R← Ls,χσ for
a fixed uniformly random s, find s.
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Definition 3.14 (Decision-LWE Problem). Given m independent samples (ai, bi), decide
whether this samples are distributed according to Ls,χσ for a fixed uniformly random s; or
according to an uniform distribution over Znq × Zq.
The last problem we will explain is called the Short Integer Solution, proposed by Ajtai in
[Ajt96]. This problem yields a collision-resistant hash function, and will be useful to define a
lattice-based compressing commitment scheme in section 4.3.1.
Definition 3.15 (Short Integer Solution (SIS)). Given a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a positive
γ ∈ R, the Short Integer Solution consists in finding a non-zero vector z ∈ Zm with ‖z‖2 ≤ γ
such that:
fA(z) := Az = 0 ∈ Znq
Notice that this problem is equivalent to finding a sufficiently short non-zero vector in the
lattice Λ⊥q (A).
This problem also admits an inhomogeneous version, in which given a target vector t ∈ Znq,
the goal is to find a short integer solution to the equation Az = t, where A and t are
independent and chosen uniformly at random.
These problems are supposed to be resistant against quantum adversaries, and therefore
are used in many cryptographic applications in order to achieve long term security.
3.3 Ideal lattices
Encryption schemes based on these lattice problems are the main hope for post-quantum
cryptography. Nonetheless, considering lattices as explained above arise some issues that
make these schemes impractical. The most important one is that for an n-dimensional lattice
basis, we require storage for an n× n matrix, and therefore quadratic space on the size of the
lattice, which becomes big for a reasonable dimension n. To solve this issue, along with some
other problems regarding speed of operations, ideal lattices were proposed.
Given a fixed vector f = (f1, ... , fn) ∈ Zn we define the following transformation matrix:
F =

0 ... 0 −f1
. . . −f2
In−1
...
. . . −fn

Definition 3.16 (Ideal lattice). An ideal lattice L is the lattice generated by the matrix
A =
[
a, Fa, ... , Fn−1a
]
for a vector a ∈ Zn.
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The name ideal lattices comes from the fact that these kind of lattices can be seen as ideals
in the polynomial ring R = Z[X ]/ 〈f (X )〉, where the polynomial f (X ) = X n + fnX n−1 + · · ·+
f2X + f1 ∈ Z[X ]. Usually, for real cryptographic applications, we will set n a power of 2 and
f (X ) = X n + 1 and we will consider the quotient ring Rq = R/qR = Zq[X ]/ 〈X n + 1〉 since
this setting provides several advantages from an implementation point of view (see section
4.1.1).
In this case the matrix A is an anti-cyclic integer matrix:
A =

a1 −an −an−1 ... −a2
a2 a1 −an ... −a3






an an−1 an−2 ... a1





i−1. It is easy to check that given two polynomials a, p ∈ Rq the product
a · p ∈ Rq is equivalent to the product of the matrix A with the vector p = (p1, ... , pn). This
allows us to perform polynomial multiplications in O(n log(n)) time complexity and O(log(n))
parallel depth if we use the Fast Fourier Transform.
Moreover, the quadratic space complexity issue is solved as we are able to represent an
ideal lattice with only n values. Finally, security is guaranteed since reductions among some
instances of the problems of section 3.2 are kept when considering them over ideal lattices
[LPR13].
3.4 Ring learning with errors
Let n and q be integers, R = Z[X ]/ 〈f (X )〉 with deg(f ) = n and Rq = R/qR. Let
χσ a discrete probability distribution over R (usually a Gaussian distribution) with standard
deviation σ and a secret polynomial s ∈ Rq.
Definition 3.17 (Ring Learning With Errors Distribution). The RLWE distribution Ls,χ over
Rq ×Rq is sampled by choosing a
R← Rq, e
R← χσ and outputting (a, b = a · s + e mod q).
Definition 3.18 (Search-RLWE Problem). Given m independent samples (ai , bi)
R← Ls,χ for
a fixed uniformly random s, find s.
Definition 3.19 (Decision-RLWE Problem). Given m independent samples (ai , bi), decide
whether this samples are distributed according to Ls,χσ for a fixed uniformly random s; or
according to an uniform distribution over Rq ×Rq.
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Hardness of RLWE comes for large enough choices of q. Solving certain instantiations of
Search-RLWE is as hard as quantumly solving a γ-SVP when γ(n) ≈ poly(n) on any ideal
lattice.
The mechanism that we will use to encrypt the votes in an electronic voting is based on




Definition 4.1 (Public-key encryption scheme). A public-key encryption scheme E is a triple
of efficient algorithms E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) that works as follows:
• Gen: The generator algorithm, takes as input the security parameter 1λ and computes
a public key and a secret key (pk , sk)
R← Gen(1λ) and finite sets Mλ and Cλ.
• Enc: The encoding algorithm, takes a public key pk and the message m ∈Mλ we wish
to encrypt and computes a ciphertext c
R← Enc(pk , m) belonging to Cλ.
• Dec: The decoding algorithm, takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ Cλ and
computes m ← Dec(sk , c), where m can be a message in Mλ or a special ’failure’
value, clearly disinguishable from all normal messages. Note that, in contrast with Gen
and Enc, the Dec algorithm is deterministic.
We also require the encryption scheme to work properly so decryption undoes encryption
with overwhelming probability, that is, we require that this correctness property holds for every
(pk , sk)
R← Gen(1λ) and every m ∈Mλ:
1− Pr [m = Dec(sk , Enc(pk , m))] ∈ negl(λ).
Intuitively, for an encryption scheme to be secure we need that, for any ciphertext c , it is
impossible for any adversary A to recover the plaintext m unless it knows the secret key sk .
This intuition leads to the notion of Public Key Encryption One-Way Chosen Plaintext Attack
Security (PKE-OW-CPA).
Definition 4.2 (PKE-OW-CPA Security). An encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc , Dec) is said




∣∣∣∣∣ (pk , sk) R← Gen(1λ); m R←Mλ;c R← Enc(pk , m); m̂ R← A(1λ, pk , c)
]
∈ negl(λ)
Although this seems like a strong definition of security, the reality is that information can be
obtained from an encryption even if the message is not fully recovered. For instance, a scheme
that encrypts only the first half of a message and leaves the second half unchanged can be
OW-CPA secure, if the encrypted half is well encrypted, but the second half of the cipher might
reveal crucial information. Thus, it is necessary to define a stronger notion of security. The
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idea will be to encrypt data in such a way that it is indistinguishable from a random ciphertext.
A possible approach to this idea is to design a scheme that, given two different messages and
an encryption of one of them, it is hard to find out which one of the original messages has
been encrypted. The definition of Public Key Encryption Indistinguishable Chosen Plaintext
Attack Security (PKE-IND-CPA) arises from this approach
Definition 4.3 (PKE-IND-CPA Security). An encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc , Dec) is said
to be PKE-IND-CPA secure if for every PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) the following holds:∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
b = b̂





Although is not indicated, there can be communication between both parts of the adversary.
That is, A1 might generate some information that A2 could take as an input.
IND-CPA security is also called semantic security.
Note that the demand on this definition of security is that the probability of correctly
guessing the bit is at a negligible distance from 1/2, which means that the adversary is
practically outputting results randomly. Moreover, observe that this definition implies the
necessity for the encryption to be probabilistic. If the encryption is deterministic, the adversary
can simply encrypt one of the messages (for example m0), compare it to the ciphertext and
return b̂ = 0 if they coincide and b̂ = 1 otherwise. The adversary achieves a winning probability
of 1.
There are several ways to improve the concept of security, for instance, providing the
adversary more resources. From the definition of PKE-IND-CPA Security we may give to
the adversary access to an oracle, in order to make the adversary able to decrypt its own
ciphertexts (as long as they do not coincide with the given one) before trying to guess the bit.
This notion of security is called Public Key Encryption Indistinguishable Chosen Ciphertext
Attack Security (PKE-IND-CCA).
Definition 4.4 (PKE-IND-CCA Security). An encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc , Dec) is said
to be PKE-IND-CCA secure if for every PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) the following holds:∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
b = b̂





where the behaviour of the oracle is as follows:
ODec(c ′) =
{
Dec(sk , c ′) if c ′ 6= c
’failure’ if c ′ = c
IND-CCA security is also called active security.
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This notion implies a high level of security on the scheme, since the decoding oracle makes
the adversary really powerful. Nevertheless, reaching this level of security implies that the
scheme must not have some homomorphic properties, which may be useful in some scenarios
such as electronic voting.
4.1.1 RLWE encryption scheme
RLWE encryption scheme was first proposed by Lyubachevsky, Peikert and Regev in [LPR13],
and it is based on the hardness of RLWE problems.
The encryption scheme works as follows:
Definition 4.5 (RLWE encryption scheme). We consider the ringRq = Zq[X ]/ 〈X n + 1〉 with
n a power of 2 and q a prime. Messages are strings of n bits encoded as a polynomial in Rq.
The error distribution χσ will be the discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation
σ = αq/
√
2π over R, which will give ‘small’ elements of Rq.
• Gen(1λ): Compute suitable n and q according to λ. Choose a R← Rq and small
s, e
R← χσ. Output sk = s and pk = (a, b = a · s + e) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
• Enc(pk , z , r , e1, e2): To encrypt a message z ∈ {0, 1}n we view it as an element in Rq
by using its bits as the 0-1 coefficients of a polynomial. Then we choose small elements
r , e1, e2





z) ∈ Rq ×Rq
• Dec(sk , (u, v)): Compute:




z − (r · a + e1) · s




z − r · a · s − e1 · s




z − r · a · s − e1 · s










The choice of some parameters for RLWE and other lattice based cryptosystems is an open
question, but there are some proposals in the literature that take into account different factors
such as security levels or attacker types [RS10], requirements of security reductions [Reg05]
or upper bounds on the decryption error probability [LP10].
The choices of q and σ determine if the encryption scheme works properly. If they are
correct, the coefficients of e · r − e1 · s + e2 can be upper-bounded by less than q4 and the
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closest modulo q. Also, this scheme allows to define a new algorithm Re-Enc to re-encrypt
previously encrypted data. This algorithm works as follows:
• Re-Enc(pk , (u, v), r ′, e ′1, e
′
2): To re-encrypt a message z encrypted as (u, v) we choose
small r ′, e ′1, e
′
2
R← χσ and output the pair
(u′, v ′) = (u, v) + Enc(pk , 0, r ′, e ′1, e
′
2) ∈ Rq ×Rq
This homomorphic operation preserves the plaintext z , although the error terms may grow
linearly when applying re-encryption several times. To avoid potential mistakes, the number
of re-encryptions must be taken into account when choosing q and σ, in order to achieve a
sufficiently small error term even after applying as much re-encryptions as desired. Details
about the error distribution and probabilities can be found in [San16].
This cryptosystem is used in many applications such as electronic voting, and it is the
encryption scheme that we will consider for our purposes. It has been proved that the RLWE
encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, assuming the hardness of RLWE problems [LPR13].
4.2 Trapdoor functions
Encryption schemes admit some mathematical abstraction. In particular, they imply the
existence of families of functions which are easy to apply (encryption) but difficult to in-
vert (decryption) unless a secret key is known. Formally, given a family F = {Fλ}λ∈N,
Fλ = {fk : Xk → Yk}k∈Kλ we can define the following properties:
• Efficiently computable. The family is efficiently computable if there exists a PPT
algorithm Eval such that
Eval(k , x) = fk(x)




A(1λ, k , y) ∈ f −1k (y) | k
R← Kλ; x
R← Xλ; y ← fk(x)
]
∈ negl(λ)








When a function f : Kλ ×Xλ → Yλ of this kind ”compresses” its input, i.e. |Xλ| > |Yλ|,
it is often called a hash function.
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4.2.1 Ajtai’s One-Way function
The most used one-way function in a lattice setting is the one stated by Miklos Ajtai in
[Ajt96], and it is based on the hardness of the SIS problem. Given a ring R (usually R = Zq
or R = Zq[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉)
and a fixed matrix A ∈ Rn×m this function is defined as:
fA : Rm −→ Rn
s 7−→ As
Therefore, the SIS problem consists in finding small elements in the kernel of this appli-
cation. Observe that for any A, once discovered a solution s for this matrix, any extension





as a solution. Therefore, the SIS problem does not
get harder as m increases. In fact, some columns ai can be ignored as desired, making the
problem easier.
For an instance of a SIS problem with R = Zq, if γ and m are not large enough it
could happen that there exists no solution. An easy pigeon-hole argument proves that when
γ ≥
√
dn log qe and m ≥ dn log qe, the existence of a solution is guaranteed. Indeed, if this is
the case, we can assume without loss of generality m = dn log qe. Then there are more than
qm vectors x ∈ {0, 1}m, and there must be two of them x and x′ such that Ax = Ax′ ∈ Znq, so
x−x′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m is a solution, since ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ ‖1‖2 =
√
m and by hypothesis
√
m ≤ γ.
The previous result implies that the Ajtai’s function family {fA : Zmq → Znq} is collision
resistant, assuming SIS hardness, since a collision (x, x′) immediately yields a solution for SIS.
Micciano and Regev stated in [MR09] that for a large m, one should solve SIS for a sub-
matrix where the number of columns is
√
n log q/logδ, for some constant δ, and expectation
is to find a vector of length approximately min{q, 2
√
n log q log δ}. The value δ is related to the
optimal block-size in BKZ reduction [GN08] and in optimal lattice reductions is δ ≈ 1.005.
4.3 Commitment schemes
Suppose we want to send a message and keep it secret for a period of time. A commitment
scheme allows us to hide the message until we want to reveal it and prove that it was not
modified during the time it remained secret. Those two properties are called respectively hiding
and binding.
Definition 4.6 (Non-interactive Commitment Scheme). A non-interactive commitment scheme
is a pair of efficient algorithms (Gen, Com) that works as follows:
• Gen: The generator algorithm, takes as input the security parameter 1λ and computes a
commitment key ck
R← Gen(1λ) and finite spaces Cck ,Rck andMck . It also generates an
efficiently sampleable probability distribution DRck and a binding set Bck ⊂Mck ×Rck .
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• Com: The committing algorithm, takes the message m ∈ Mck we wish to commit
to and randomness r
R← DRck and computes a commitment c ← Comck(m; r), where
c ∈ Cck .
Usually, given a commitment c , we say that m is a valid opening for c if c = Com(m; r)
for some randomness r (maybe with overwhelming probability). The binding property ensures
that in such a case, m was the original message to which we had committed. It is necessary to
dispose of a mechanism to verify if a given message is a valid opening for a given commitment.
In fact, some commitment schemes include a third algorithm Ver that verifies openings of
commitments.
As indicated above, the commitment scheme must satisfy the properties of hiding and
binding. Specifically, we will require these properties to hold against PPT adversaries. In
other words, adversaries will not be able neither to discover the committed value (compu-
tationally hiding) nor to find a commitment that can be opened to more than one message
(computationally binding). Formally:
• Computationally hiding. A commitment scheme is said to be computationally hiding
if for all interactive PPT adversaries A:∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
b̂ = b





• Computationally binding. A commitment scheme is said to be computationally bind-
ing if for all interactive PPT adversaries A:
Pr
[
m0 6= m1 ∧
Comck(m0; r0) = Comck(m1; r1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ck R← Gen(1λ);(m0, r0, m1, r1) R← A(ck)
]
∈ negl(λ)
Definition 4.7 (Homomorphic commitment). The commitment scheme is homomorphic if
the message, randomness and commitment spaces are additive abelian groups and we have
that for all λ ∈ N, and for all ck R← Gen(1λ), for all m0, m1 ∈Mck and r0, r1 ∈ Rck :
Comck(m0; r0) + Comck(m1; r1) = Comck(m0 + m1; r0 + r1)
Definition 4.8 (Compressing commitment). A commitment scheme is said to be compressing
if the size of the commitments are smaller than the size of the committed values.
4.3.1 A SIS-based commitment scheme
Baum et al. proposed in [BBC+18] a compressing commitment scheme based on the hardness
of SIS. In particular it uses Ajtai’s function
fA(s) = As
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for a secret s ∈ Rn and A ∈ Rr×n. This scheme uses the fact that SIS hardness remains
unaffected as n increases, as stated in section 4.2.1.
The scheme allows to commit messages in Zq with q < q̄, and uses uniformly random
matrices A1 ∈ Z
r×2r logq q̄
q̄ and A2 ∈ Zr×nq̄ as the commitment key, where n is the number of
elements we want to commit to. To commit n messages m ∈ Znq, we pick r
R← Z2r logq q̄q and
output the commitment vector v = A1r + A2m mod q̄.
The whole commitment scheme is as follows:
• Gen(1λ): Select a ring R (Z or Z[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉
) and let Rq̄ = R/q̄R.
Select parameters q, q̄, n, v , N , B ,σ.
Pick uniformly random matrices A1
R← Rr×r logq q̄q̄ and A2
R← Rr×nq̄ .
Return ck = (q, q̄, n, v , l , N , B ,Rq̄, A1, A2). The commitment key defines the spaces:
Mck = Rnq̄ Rck = R
2r logq q̄








∈ Rn+2r logq q̄q̄
∣∣∣ ‖s‖2 < B} DRck = D rσ
• Comck(m; r) : Return c = A1r + A2s
It is also possible to commit to multiple vectors if we translate the scheme to a matrix
notation. For instance, the commitment of l messages M = [m1, ... , ml ] with randomness
R = [r1, ... , rl ] would be C = Comck(M; R) = [c1, ... , cl ].
The scheme is hiding due to the leftover hash lemma [HILL99] which shows that (A1r, A1
mod q) is statistically close to uniform. The binding property is a direct consequence of
the hardness of the SIS problem. If there were (r, m) 6= (r′, m′) such that A1r + A2m =










, if the parameters of the scheme are correctly chosen.
Notice that this commitment scheme would be compressing. Indeed, to commit a secret
s ∈ Znq we take public random matrices A1 ∈ Z
r×2r logq q̄
q̄ and A2 ∈ Zr×nq̄ and a random vector
r ∈ Z2r logq q̄q . Hence we need r log q̄ bits to commit to n values over Zq. With a good choice of
parameters (see table 2) the commitment scheme will still be computationally binding based
on the worst-case hardness of SIVP.
4.4 Zero-Knowledge proofs of knowledge
Sometimes in cryptographic protocols is necessary to prove some knowledge, without revealing
information at all. Zero-Knowledge proofs are mechanisms that allow us to attain this, so they
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play a crucial part in applications such as authentication protocols, electronic voting systems,
encryption primitives, multi-party computation schemes, and verifiable computation protocols.
To formalize the concept of zero-knowledge proof, let L be a language in NP and a binary
relation R ⊂ L×L. We call statement to any x ∈ L, and we say that ω is a witness for x if
(x ,ω) ∈ R. With this background, we can introduce the concept of Σ-Protocol.
Definition 4.9 (Σ-Protocol). A Σ-Protocol is a protocol between a prover P and a verifier
V where, given a statement x , P tries to convince V that he knows a witness ω for x . We
use the following notation:
ZKP [ ω | (x ,ω) ∈ R]
Usually, this protocol has three steps:
1. Commitment. The prover P sends a commitment message t to the verifier V
2. Challenge. The verifier sends a random challenge c to the prover.
3. Final answer. The prover sends an answer z and the verifies accepts or rejects the
proof checking the conversation tr = (x , t, c , z). If so, the tuple (x , t, c , z) is called
an accepting conversation. Sometimes we consider that the verifier outputs a bit, with
value 1 if he accepts the proof and 0 otherwise.
While this is the most common structure of a Σ-Protocol, with this 3-move setting that
resembles the shape of the Σ, notice that is possible to perform more moves if needed.
Nonetheless, the underlying behaviour of the protocol is always the same.
The prover may have to demonstrate to a large number of verifiers. Engaging in a proof
with each one of them would suppose a great waste of time, considering that the verifier’s
task is simply to send challenges at random. It is possible to transform an interactive proof
to a non-interactive proof without a specific verifier, where the prover gets the challenges by
himself as the result of a hash function applied to the commitment. This procedure is called
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87].
Also, we introduce these three properties:
• Completeness. If P is honest and does know a witness ω for x , then V always accepts
the proof.
• Soundness. For any pair of accepting conversations tr = (x , t, c , z), tr ′ = (x , t, c ′, z ′)
with c 6= c ′ it is possible to extract a witness ω such that (x ,ω) ∈ R.
• Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK). The verifier learns nothing about the
witness but the fact that the prover knows it.
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Definition 4.10 (Zero-Knowledge proof of knowledge). A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
is a Σ-Protocol that verifies completeness, soundness and HVZK.
There are several ways to mathematically formalize the properties stated above. In partic-
ular we are interested in the ones used for the arguments in [BCC+16, BBC+18] which will be
the arguments we will adapt to our purposes. These formalized concepts consider some public
information called common reference string known by all parties in the protocol.
• Statistical Completeness. Given a function ρ : N → [0, 1], then the protocol has
statistical completeness with completeness error ρ if for all adversaries A:
Pr
[
(x ,ω) ∈ R ∧ b = 0
∣∣∣∣∣ (x ,ω) R← A;(tr , b) R← (P(x ,ω),V(x))
]
≤ ρ(λ)
• Computational knowledge soundness. Given a function ε : N → [0, 1], then the
protocol has computational knowledge soundness if for all PPT P∗ there is a polynomial
time extractor E such that for all PPT adversaries A:
Pr
[
(x ,ω) 6∈ R ∧ b = 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (x , s) R← A (tr , b) R← (P∗(x , s),V(x))ω R← EP∗(u,s)(u, tr , b)
]
≤ ε(λ)
• Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (SHVZK) A protocol is SHVZK if there
exists a PPT simulator S such that for all interactive adversaries cA:
Pr
[
(x ,ω) ∈ R ∧ A(tr) = 1
∣∣∣ (x ,ω, %) R← A; (tr , b) R← (P(x ,ω),V(x ; %))]
≈ Pr
[
(x ,ω) ∈ R ∧ A(tr) = 1
∣∣∣ (x ,ω, %) R← A; (tr , b) R← S(x , %)]
where % is the randomness of the verifier.
It is obvious that the completeness property is necessary so the protocol works in a desirable
way. The objective of the soundness property is to bound the probability that a dishonest prover
can fool the verifier. Consider a (maybe dishonest) prover. Once the commitment is sent, if
the prover is indeed dishonest he will only be able to answer one of the possible challenges
and fool the verifier. Since the challenge set size is usually exponential, the probability of
this to happen is negligible. If he were able to answer to two different challenges correctly,
he would be able to efficiently extract a witness, and therefore he would be honest. Finally,
honest-verifier zero-knowledge implies that the verifier has not learned any new information
from the prover, since it is possible to simulate the proof without knowing a witness if the
challenges are known in advance.
Definition 4.11 (Zero-Knowledge argument of knowledge). A Zero-Knowledge argument of
knowledge is a Σ-Protocol that verifies statistical completeness, computational knowledge
soundness and SHVZK.
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4.4.1 Zero-knowledge argument for preimages of Ajtai’s function
Here we present a zero-knowledge argument for l equations given by Ajtai’s one-way function
over a ring Rq = R/qR (with R = Z or R = Z[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉
), proposed in [BBC+18].
Given matrices A ∈ Rr×vq and T ∈ Rr×lq , with this method the prover can prove knowledge
of a witness S = [s1, ... , sl ] ∈ Rv×l with ‖si‖2 ≤ β such that AS = c · T. In particular, this
proof allows to prove knowledge of committed messages using the commitment scheme 4.3.1,
and therefore proving that those messages were fixed in advance.
ZKP
[
S = [s1, ... , sl ] ∈ Rv×l
∣∣∣∣∣ AS = cT‖si‖2 ≤ β
]
Protocol 1: Proof for Ajtai’s function preimages










Z = SC + Y
Abort if Rej (Z, B,σ, ρ) = 1
Z
−−−−−−−−→





= TC + W
The challenge set depends on the ring we are working on. For R = Z, C = {0, 1}, while
for R = Z[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉
, C = {0}
⋃
{±X j}j<d
This argument does not exactly follow the definition given in section 4.4. First, we are
slacking the condition of the preimages with the factor c . The proof over Z achieves c = 1
and therefore an exact value, but for Z[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉
it only guarantees c = 2. Despite this
’slack’, it is still good enough for many applications since it allows to prove knowledge of the
plaintext. In fact, over the polynomial ring Z[X ]/
〈
X d + 1
〉
the proof can be shorter, since
we can pick a challenge matrix with a number of columns approximately λ/ log 2d , due to the
invertibility of the difference of monomials in R, stated by Benhamouda et al. in [BCK+14].
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Secondly, since we are trying to prove knowledge of a matrix S in zero-knowledge, the
output matrix Z must have an independent distribution from S. During the protocol, the
prover calculates B + Y, where B depends on the secret S, and Y is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution in order to ’mask´ this dependency. Therefore, to remove the dependency of B+Y
on B we must apply a technique that aborts the protocol if this dependency is noticeable. We
can mathematically ensure the correct performance of this technique thanks to lemma 4.12,
proposed by Vadim Lyubashevsky in [Lyu12], which uses the rejection sampling Rej (1). With
this result the protocol would need in average ρ iterations until the challenge overpass the
abort step, where ρ is a constant that depends on σ. Nevertheless, in practice we will be more
interested in the non-interactive protocol obtained by Fiat-Shamir, which only outputs a proof
after obtaining a challenge that passes the abort step.
Algorithm 1: Rej (Z, B,σ, ρ)
u
R← [0, 1);











Lemma 4.12 ([Lyu12]). Let B ∈ Rr×n. Consider a procedure that samples Y R← D r×nσ and
returns the output of Rej(Z = Y + B, B,σ, ρ) with σ ≥ 12
ln ρ
· ‖B‖2. The probability for this
procedure to output 1 is within 2−100 of 1/ρ. The distribution of Z, given the output is 1, is
within statistical distance 2−100 of D r×nσ .
Finally we can state the main result from this section, and give the conditions that the
parameters must fulfill to achieve a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, for the case R = Z:
Theorem 4.13 ([BBC+18]). Let v , r ∈ poly(λ) and n ≥ λ + 2. Let s, ρ,σ ∈ R such that s
is an upper bound for s1(S), ρ > 1 a constant, σ ≥ 12ln ρs
√
nl , and B =
√
2vσ. Then protocol
described in section 4.4.1 is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
And for the case R = Z/
〈
X d + 1
〉
:
Theorem 4.14 ([BBC+18]). Let v , r ∈ poly(λ) and n ≥ λ+2
log(2d+1)
. Let s, ρ,σ ∈ R such that
s is an upper bound for s1(S), ρ > 1 a constant, σ ≥ 12ln ρs
√
nl , and B =
√
2mdσ. Then
protocol described in section 4.4.1 is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
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5. Arithmetic circuit satisfiability
5.1 Introduction to arithmetic circuits
An arithmetic circuit over a ring R is a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are called
gates and edges are called wires. Gates of in-degree 0 are called input gates and usually are
associated to variables or constants. The remaining gates are either multiplication gates or




. We can consider only binary operations,
therefore multiplication and addition gates have in-degree equal to 2, and out-degree equal to
1, although we allow the result to be attached to several other gates as input. In this case,
we say the gate is fan-in 2 and operands are usually called left and right.
If we consider an arithmetic circuit with N fan-in 2 gates as described above there are in
total 3N input and output wires feeding in and out the gates. An instance of an arithmetic
circuit is a description of it, and includes a set of gates, the connection wires between them
and known values assigned to some of the inputs and outputs. We say such circuit is satisfiable
if there exists an assignment complying all the gates, the wires and the known values in the
instance. More precisely, a witness for a given instance consists of assignments to the input
and output wires of each gate such that:
• The known values match the corresponding assignments of the witness.
• The output of each gate corresponds to the result of applying the operation to the input
wires of the gate
• The value of an output wire (or an input gate) matches the value of all input wires
connected to it.
The natural behaviour of arithmetic circuits is calculating linear relations and checking
constraints satisfiability. Even though the computational nature of an arithmetic circuit implies
the impossibility of storing the symbolic expression of a polynomial, sometimes is desirable to
prove equality between two polynomials. To sort out this issue we will use the Schwartz-Zippel
lemma, which allows us to bound the probability of two polynomials being distinct when the
evaluations are equal, if some conditions are met.
Lemma 5.1 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let p be a non-zero multivariate polynomial in Zq[X1, ... , Xn]
of degree d. Then the probability that p(x1, ... , xn) = 0 for uniformly random chosen
x1, ... , xn
R← Z∗q is at most dq−1
Informally, the Schwartz-Zippel lemma states that if we evaluate two polynomials several
times on different random points and we always obtain the same value, the chances are that
they are the same polynomial.
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To construct arguments for satisfiabilty of the circuit we will explain the method proposed
by Baum et al. [BBC+18]. The main idea is to use previous arguments of circuit satisfiability
[BCC+16, Gro09] based on the discrete logarithm hardness assumption and adapt them to a
lattice setting, in particular to the SIS assumption.
5.2 Reduction to polynomial equations
The argument for the satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit over Zq can be reduced to the veri-
fication of multiplication constraints (arising from multiplication gates) and linear constraints
(arising from addition gates and multiplication by constants). Then, it is possible to reduce
again this set of constraints to two polynomial equations.
Suppose the arithmetic circuit consists in N = nm multiplication gates. We can assume
that the circuit has been pre-processed so the input and output wires feed into and go out from
only multiplication gates (see [BCC+16] for details). Now, we define three m × n matrices
A, B and C such that their entries correspond to the left, right and output of each gate,
respectively. To prove satisfiability of the arithmetic circuit, it must hold:
A ◦ B = C (1)
where ◦ is the entry-wise product (also called Hadamard product), which yields a system of
N equations.
Also, to keep track of the relations between outputs and inputs of the gates, we can express









ci ·wu,c,i = Ku (2)
where ai, bi and ci are the rows of A, B and C. For instance, to express the relation
a1,1 + a1,2 = b1,1
we will set:
U = 1
w1,a,i = (1, 1, 0, ... 0)
w1,b,i = (−1, 0, ... 0)
w1,c,1 = (0, ... 0)
and all the remaining vectors to zero.
With this method we have reduced the arithmetic circuit satisfiability to the verification
of a set of N + U equations. The next step is to translate those N + U equations to two
polynomial equations over a formal indeterminate Y .
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For the N equations 1, if we consider the polynomials with i -th coefficients the terms of









We can also consider an analogous process for the U constraint equations on the wires, so








































then the circuit is satisfied if and only if the following two equations hold:
m∑
i=1
ai ·wa,i(Y ) +
m∑
i=1
bi ·wb,i(Y ) +
m∑
i=1
ci ·wc,i(Y )− K (Y ) = 0 (3)
m∑
i=1





Now, to prove these equations hold, one can define polynomials which will have some
terms equal to zero if the equations hold. This can be proved if the prover shows evaluations
of these polynomials at random points to the verifier. For example, if we define























With this construction the equation 4 is verified if and only if the Xm+1 term of a(X )◦b(X )
is c and therefore we can check whether equation 4 is satisfied. An analogous way allows to
prove if equation 3 is also satisfied.
Now, to apply the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, we require the base field to have a super-
polynomial size over the security parameter λ. This is not the case, as this proof is considered
for a smaller q, namely a polynomial over λ. To apply the lemma, following the argument of
Cramer et al. [CDK14], the reduction to polynomial equations is extended to a field extension
GF (q2k) = Zp[φ]/ 〈f (φ)〉. Therefore the size is exponentiated by a factor of 2k and the
Schwartz-Zippel lemma ensures overwhelming soundness.
By choosing a good basis B for GF (q2k) it is possible to perform multiplications of elements
in this extension field without any overflow modulo f , and therefore simulate arithmetic on
the extension using arithmetic in Z2kq . In this case, if we want to multiply on the left by an
element x ∈ GF (q2k), we can consider the matrix Mx that simulates multiplication by x in Z2kq .
Now the procedure is analogous to the one over the smaller field, but considering N = mnk
multiplication gates and elements in Z2k×nq as elements whose n columns are elements of
GF (q2k) (we refer to [BBC+18] for the details).
5.3 Arithmetic circuit satisfiability argument
Since we have reduced the proof of satisfiability to two polynomial equations, we will give two
sub-protocols to verify each of these equations. Then we proceed to show the parameters
which must be chosen carefully for our purposes. And finally we calculate the efficiency of the
whole argument, and state that it has sub-linear communication.
It is important to notice that in a lattice setting we require the messages (in this case, the
values of the wires that work as witnesses) to have small norm, in order to take advantage of
the SIS assumption. In this case, for an arithmetic circuit which works on a field modulo p the
aim is to preserve secrecy for the values of the wires, so we need to commit to these values
over another prime which is greater than q, to make the openings small on this larger ring. In
other words, although we are operating on Zq, we are considering the values on a larger Zq̄.
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The argument of section 4.4.1 provides a manner to check that preimages of Ajtai’s function
have small norm modulo a prime q̄, which we can specify with the desired size. This may
cause difficulties since values over the large ring can be different but congruent modulo q. In
the final part of the proof, the prover will send an additional commitment E that contains a
multiple of q to solve the issue.
5.3.1 Argument for multiplicative relations and linear constraints
Here we discuss the argument that allows a prover to prove knowledge of N = nkm triples
satisfying multiplicative relations. In it we will use an extension of the commitment scheme
explained in section 4.3.1. Let A ∈ Z2k×nq̄ and R ∈ Z2k×n
′









where ai and ri are the rows of A and R .
Both the prover and the verifier know the commitment key ck and the basis B which
specifies how the multiplications are performed. The complete protocol
ZKP
[
Ai , Bi , Ci ∈ Zk×nq
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ {1, ... , m} : Ai ◦ Bi ≡ Ci mod q
]
can be found in appendix A.
Secondly, to prove knowledge of linear constraints that are part of the arithmetic circuit
alongside the product relations, we must give an argument to prove knowledge of vectors ai ,j ,
bi ,j , ci ,j ∈ Znq, such that for a statement formed by vectors wu,a,i ,j , wu,b,i ,j , wu,c,i ,j arising from
an arithmetic circuit instance, this equation hold:
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
ai,j ·wu,a,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
bi,j ·wu,b,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1








ai,j ·wu,a,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
bi,j ·wu,b,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
ci,j ·wu,c,i ,j = Ku
]
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can be found in appendix B.
Combining both protocols, we are able to give a zero-knowledge proof for arithmetic circuit
satisfiability. The prover commits to n wire values forming O(mk) commitments and runs both
protocols, reusing the same commitments. If the verifier accepts both protocols, the prover
will have proved knowledge of values that satisfy the arithmetic circuit.
5.3.2 Efficiency
Both arguments use 9 moves between prover and verifier (including the sub-protocols to prove
knowledge for the commitments). Sub-linear communication is achieved if the choice of pa-
rameters is wise. Concretely, it is possible to achieve communication in O(
√
Nλ log3(N))
elements of Zq̄, prover calculations in O(N log(N)(log λ)2) bit operations and verifier calcu-
lations in O(N(log λ)3) bit operations. Moreover, a good choice of parameters is essential to
prove that the argument fulfills the requirements to be a zero-knowledge proof. The proposal
of Baum et al. [BBC+18] is to use the parameters according to table 2.
Parameter Size Description
λ Security parameter
q poly(λ) Field for arithmetic circuit






k k ≈ λ/ log2 q Control of soundness error
m m = N/kn Number of commitments
q̄ q̄ ∈ O(N3k2m2q4
√
r) Modulus for SIS instances
r r ∈ O(log n) Size of the commitments
Table 2: Parameter selection.
5.4 Example: RLWE encryption proof
The aim of this section is to illustrate how arithmetic circuit satisfiability can be useful to
model a real zero-knowledge proof in a simple cryptographic application. Since we will work
with the RLWE encryption scheme, we will give an example of a proof of knowledge that will
allow a prover P to implement a RLWE encryption of N messages and demonstrate that he
performed it in an honest way. In other words, the prover will create a list {z1, ... , zN} of
messages and will output a list {c1, ... , cN} of ciphertexts that will be public. The prover will




2 for i ∈ {1, ... , N} without revealing them.
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2 , i ∈ [N]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ [N] :
{















To set up this proof we must craft an arithmetic circuit that executes the RLWE encryption.
In this arithmetic circuit some values will be public and some other will remain private. The
public ones will be part of the statement, so if P proves knowledge of the private values, it
will be equivalent to prove knowledge of the random parameters of the encryption.
The arithmetic circuit of one encryption is given in figure 1, where the public values are
colored in blue and the secret ones in red. To complete the whole circuit, just assemble N
copies of this sub-circuit.
Figure 1: Arithmetic circuit for a RLWE encryption
To prove that the parameters of the encryption are small, we engage in a ZKP as explained
in section 4.4.1 within the ambient field. The value of δ will depend on the total number of
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re-encryptions we wish to perform after the first encryption, since the errors can stack and
grow linearly in this amount of re-encryptions. If we wish to perform just one encryption, the
value must verify that
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6. Proof of a shuffle
In this section we will explain the main result of this thesis. The goal is to define a shuffle in an
electronic voting process and give a protocol in a lattice based setting to prove its correctness,
using the results from the previous sections.
6.1 Voting process
In an electronic voting process the first step is the voter to cast its vote. At that time, the
vote is encrypted and signed, and the signature is checked to be valid. Therefore every vote
is unique and linked to the voter, so it is necessary to ensure that it is not possible to track
a vote so that the option chosen by a voter can be found out. After the verification of the
signature in the census, the encrypted vote (without the signature), goes forward to a shuffling
phase. A shuffle is a mechanism whose purpose is to hide the origin of the votes in order to
make this tracking difficult. Let us suppose that a total of N votes get to this phase. The
shuffle phase consists in several mixing nodes that take the N ciphertexts as an input and then
re-encrypt and randomly permute them, and output the result. The desired behaviour is that
the input list and the output list contain the same information, i.e. the same plaintexts, but
in a random order. This re-encrypting and permuting operation is called a shuffle. The set of
mixing nodes is called a mixing net (mix-net) [Cha81], and it is commonly used in applications
that demand privacy.
Figure 2: Mix node
Our objective is to arm each mixing node with a proof to verify that the performed shuffle
is correct. Without this proof, a malicious node could replace some ciphertexts with another
ones of his choice (for example, encrypted votes for a certain candidate) without being noticed
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and therefore manipulating the results. This proof will allow to prove that the shuffle is correct,
but it does not guarantee anonymity, since the prover can perform the shuffle with parameters
not coming from the desired distributions and allow adversaries to trace back the input from
the output. Despite this, the process is still anonymous if just one mixing node is honest
and shuffles the list accordingly to the encrypting algorithm. Additionally, the mix-node must
choose the re-encrypting parameters and the permutation at random and without revealing
them, to preserve privacy of the votes. This is the expected behaviour. In standard voting, for
our vote to remain anonymous we also need that at least one step of the process is honest.
To deposit the vote inside an envelope is equivalent to encrypt the vote, and the ballot box
acts as the random permutation.
The aim of this section is to reduce the proof of a shuffle to a zero-knowledge argument of
satisfiability of a certain arithmetic circuit. Each node receives a list of N RLWE ciphertexts
C = {c1, ... , cN} and outputs another list D = {d1, ... , dN}. If we manage to describe an
arithmetic circuit with the least possible amount of gates (i.e. an O(N log(N)) or less number
of gates) such that the list D is the result of shuffling (re-randomizing and permuting) the
list C , the communication efficiency for satisfiability stated in section 5.3.2 permits us to set
a zero-knowledge argument for a shuffle in sub-linear communication time.
As seen in section 5.4, with some slight changes, we can construct an arithmetic circuit to
perform a re-encryption (see figure 3).
Again, the public values are painted in blue and the private ones in red. Observe that we
just need 6 gates to perform the re-encryption. This yields a sub-circuit of size O(N) gates
to re-encrypt the N ciphertexts.
It remains to model the random permutation. In the first moment, the way we intended to
solve it was to adapt the proof of a shuffle of Bayer and Groth in the discrete logarithm setting
[BG12] to the lattice setting, in a similar way as [CMM17, Mar18], but using arithmetic circuits.
This method consists in creating polynomials FC ′ and FD in Rq[Γ] whose roots correspond to
the elements of each list C ′ (obtained after the re-encryption of C ) and D, respectively. If both
lists have the same elements but in a different order, the polynomials must be equal. Using
a generalized version of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma for general rings, and evaluating these
polynomials in points chosen from a suitable subset, we can check whether they are equal
or not. Nevertheless, over the ring Rq polynomials may have more roots than its degree.
Therefore, the fact FC ′ = FD does not imply C
′ = D, since a malicious prover could replace
one element of the list C ′ with a root of FD . Besides, elements of both lists are not single
polynomials in Rq, but pairs of polynomials. It was necessary to find a way to merge each
pair into a single polynomial, as a separate treatment is easily attacked, for instance applying
different permutations. Difficulties of this approach caused us to opt for an alternative way:
Beneš networks.
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Figure 3: Arithmetic circuit for a RLWE re-encryption
6.2 The random permutation: Beneš networks
Now the next step is to perform the secret permutation. We will use as a model a permutation
network called Beneš network proposed by Abraham Waksman in [Wak68]. The use of Beneš
networks is not new in cryptography, as early results from Masayuki Abe [Abe99] already
considered these constructions to apply them to mix-nets. Nevertheless, the asymptotic cost
of these solutions were usually worse than others, and they were considered inefficient. In this
case, the amortized cost of the proofs for Ajtai’s function preimages and the satisfiability of
arithmetic circuits may give a new opportunity to this kind of constructions.
Formally, a permutation network is an acyclic graph with N inputs and N outputs where
vertices have in-degree and out-degree equal to 2. These vertices are called switch gates and
each of them has a special input b ∈ {0, 1}, which indicates if the two inputs are switched or
if they remain in the same order (see figure 4).
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Figure 4: Switch gate
Consider a switch gate with inputs u1 and u2, and outputs v1 and v2. The switch consists
in just applying the following operation:
v1 = (1− b) · u1 + b · u2
v2 = (1− b) · u2 + b · u1
Therefore, we can craft an arithmetic circuit to model this operation (figure 5).
Figure 5: Arithmetic circuit for a switch gate
Notice that with this circuit nothing forces the wire 1 − b to actually be assigned to this
value. In fact, the wire 1 − b is just an auxiliary value aux part of the witness that we can
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state as the number which added to b results in 1, with an addition gate with inputs b and
aux and output 1.
There is another issue regarding the switching decision bits. We are simply performing an
arithmetic operation involving the inputs u1, u2, b and the outputs v1, v2. A malicious prover
could replace the bit with whichever other polynomial in Rq and since the gate is expecting
values inRq, it will still work, although not in the desirable way, as the outputs would be totally
different from the inputs. If we were working over a field, we could just prove if b(1− b) = 0
holds, and that would imply that either b = 0 or b = 1. But the ring Rq is not integral
domain, which means the existence of zero divisors, so this is not enough (although it will be
useful). To sort out this issue we will use the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1 ([LN17]). Let Rq = Zq[X ]/ 〈X n + 1〉 where n is a power of 2 and q a prime




In this case, if we prove that the euclidean norm of the bits is small, since the infinite norm
is always smaller or equal than the euclidean norm, we prove that the bits are invertible, so
they cannot be zero-divisors. Therefore if b(1− b) = 0, then the only possibilities are b = 0
or b = 1.
The bits must remain secret, since revealing them will reveal the secret permutation. We
can take advantage of the zero knowledge proof 4.4.1 and theorem 4.14. We commit to
the bits and prove knowledge of a valid opening with small norm for these commitments. It
would remain to prove that b(1 − b) = 0, but we can easily embed this proof in the circuit
satisfiability proof. Recall that we also needed that b + (1− b) = 1, so we can give another
sub-circuit in charge of checking consistency of the switch bits.
Figure 6: Arithmetic circuit for bit consistency
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Now that it is clear how to implement the nodes of a permutation network using an
arithmetic circuit, let us show how to combine them to craft a complete permutation network.
One particularity of Beneš networks is that they are constructed recursively. A 2 × 2 Beneš
network is just a switch gate, and it is trivial that a switch gate models every permutation
of 2 elements, namely the identity if b = 0 and a switch if b = 1. Now we can construct
a 2k × 2k network using two 2k−1 × 2k−1 Beneš sub-networks and 2k switch gates, that will
be able to perform whichever permutation of 2k elements. See figure 7 for an example of an
8× 8 network to clarify this construction.
Figure 7: 8x8 Beneš Network
An easy induction yields that for N = 2k , to craft a N×N network we will need 2 log2(N)−1
stages of N/2 switch gates each, therefore an O(N log(N)) amount of switch gates. Unfortu-
nately, this will worse the linear time complexity we achieved to perform the re-encryption. Nev-
ertheless, the amortized proof for satisfiability given in section 5 still allows a O(
√
N log2(N))
communication cost, which remains sub-linear in the number of voters. The decision to use
Beneš networks is given because it is possible to easily model any of the N! permutations
without deadlocks (i.e. for each wire only travels one value). Besides, Beneš networks can be
extended to arbitrary sizes, and not just powers of 2 [CM97].
One could imagine that to perform the permutation the prover could just choose the
switch bit of each gate uniformly at random from {0, 1}, and let the circuit apply the resulting
permutation. This will not be correct, since in a shuffle every permutation of N elements
must have the same probability to appear. The random choosing of the bits implies that some
permutation will appear more often than others, so the choice is not uniform, as shown in
[AH01]. Therefore, if we denote by SN the set of permutations of N elements, the prover must
first choose π
R← SN , and then run an algorithm to set the bits accordingly. These algorithms
are called routing algorithms and the best known have a complexity of O(N log(N)), such as
[CCM09], so it does not affect the asymptotic complexity of the prover.
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With these considerations, we can define a zero-knowledge argument to prove that a
permutation was fixed in advance and applied to a list of elements of Rq. The total amount
of addition and multiplication gates for a switch gate is always 8, and for an N × N Beneš
network we need O(N log(N)) switch gates, so the total size of the permutation circuit is
O(N log(N)) on the number of votes.
Since we are working with RLWE encryption, whose ciphertexts are pairs of elements of
Rq, we must extend the calculations to pairs of elements, which can be easily done if we
duplicate the amount of switch gates and carefully connect each bit to the two corresponding
gates, one for each element of the pair. The amount of gates is doubled, so it does not affect
the asymptotic cost of the circuit. With this construction we ensure that the permutation




∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ [N] : (u′′π(i), v ′′π(i)) = (u′i , v ′i )
]
6.3 A new lattice-based protocol for the correctness of a
shuffle
Finally we proceed to combine all the previous steps to provide a zero-knowledge argument
for the correctness of a shuffle. What the proof allows to verify is that, given as statement
a public list C = {c1, ... , cN}, with ci = (ui , vi) ∈ R2q, another public list D = {d1, ... , dN},






i ) ∈ R2q, D is the result of shuffling C .
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This proof will be equivalent to prove satisfiability for a circuit constructed following the
sections above. The prover runs a routing algorithm to find the bits bj for j ∈ {1, ... , G},
where G ∈ O(N log(N)) is the number of switch gates that the circuit will require. The circuit
has as public inputs conforming the statement the elements ui , vi for i ∈ {1, ... , N}, and public
outputs the elements u′′i , v
′′





i ∈ {1, ... , N} and the bits bj for j ∈ {1, ... , G}. Recall that for each bit the (honest) prover
calculates 1−bj that will be also a private input auxj whose value will be verified in the circuit.
Now, the overall protocol works as follows:
42










δ, for a δ suitable considering the number of mix-nodes.




3. The prover and the verifier engage in a ZKP like the one explained in 5.3 applied to this
particular circuit to prove its satisfiability.
4. The verifier accepts the proof if and only if all the previous proofs were accepted.
The overall complexity of the proof is dominated by the asymptotic cost of step 3, deter-
mined by the the total amount of addition and multiplication gates. There are 6N gates to
perform the re-encryption and 2 × 8G gates for the permutation. This yields an arithmetic
circuit of O(N log(N)) gates. The complexity of the poof for a circuit with M gates was
O(
√
M log3(M)) in communication, O(M log(M) log2(λ)) for the prover and O(M log3(λ))
for the verifier.
To calculate the complexity, since M ∈ O(N log(N)) and log(N log(N)) ∈ O(log(N)), we
have a total complexity of:
• O(
√
N log2(N)) for communication.
• O(N log2(N) log2(λ)) for the prover.
• O(N log(N) log3(λ)) for the verifier.
Therefore, we achieve sub-linear communication cost in the overall argument, as we in-
tended to.
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7. Conclusions
We start this thesis introducing as mathematical background the main concepts about lattices
and the main lattice-based problems such as the SIS or the RLWE, whose hardness work
as a basis for the new post-quantum cryptography. This kind of cryptography is of capital
importance nowadays due to the new paradigm of computation based on quantum physics,
which is threatening the security of classical cryptography applications.
Then, we introduce the main cryptographic objects used in public-key cryptography, such
as encryption, commitment schemes and zero-knowledge arguments. Moreover, we present
some examples for each object, namely the RLWE encryption, a commitment scheme based
on SIS and a zero-knowledge argument for openings of the previous commitment scheme.
The strategy to achieve the objective of the thesis, proving the correctness of a shuffle of
RLWE ciphertexts, consists in explaining a protocol for general arithmetic circuit satisfiability
and use this result for a certain circuit which models a shuffle. With this proof, an electronic
voting is able to use mix-nets in order to provide anonymity to the process in a verifiable
and secure way. Besides, the amortized complexity of the argument for circuits, alongside to
the relatively small amount of gates of our circuit, yields an overall argument with sub-linear
communication cost in time.
Post-quantum cryptography is a very recent branch of study for which new results appear
almost constantly. For classical arguments based on the discrete logarithm assumption, there
exist polylogarithmic time complexity arguments for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits,
while the argument we managed achieves an amortized complexity of fractional power. Recent
research [BLNS20] shows the possibility to prove knowledge for openings of commitments with
post-quantum security and in polylogarithmic communication complexity. This is an important
improvement over the results in [BBC+18]. Therefore, by replacing [BBC+18] with [BLNS20]
in our protocol, it might be possible to reduce the overall communication complexity from
fractional power to polylogarithmic.
Nevertheless, the initial objective of this thesis has been met, since we have modeled the
first post-quantum sub-linear protocol for the correctness of a shuffle.
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New lattice-based protocols for proving correctness of a shuffle
A. Argument for multiplicative relations
ZKP
[
Ai , Bi , Ci ∈ Zk×nq
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ {1, ... , m} : Ai ◦ Bi ≡ Ci mod q
]
Protocol 2: Proof for multiplicative relations









































































































M lXHl mod q


















































D = (A© B mod q)−
m∑
i=1









(M lx mod q)Hl
δ
R← D2k×n′σ2
D = Com∗ck(D; δ)
E
R← p · D2k×nσ3
ε
R← D2k×n′σ4
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P(Ai , Bi , Ci , ck ,B) V(ck ,B)










(M lx mod q)ηl + δ
Rej(ρ, ρ− δ,σ2, e)
D̄ = (Mz mod q)D + E
δ̄ = (Mz mod q)δ + e
Rej(D̄/q, D/q,σ3, e)
Rej(δ̄, δ,σ4, e)
A,α, B , β, ρ, D̄, δ̄
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→


























(M lx mod q)Hl + D
Com∗ck(D̄, δ̄)
?
= Mz mod q)D + E
D̄
?
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ai,j ·wu,a,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
bi,j ·wu,b,i ,j +
m,k∑
i=1,j=1
ci,j ·wu,c,i ,j = Ku
]
Protocol 3: Proof for linear consistency constraints














For 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
P arrange ai ,j , bi ,j , ci ,j into matrices Ai , Bi , Ci ∈ [q]k×n















































Compute a(X), b(X), c(X)
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P(ai ,j , bi ,j , ci ,j , ck ,B′) V(ck ,B′)














































































M lXHl mod q
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P(ai ,j , bi ,j , ci ,j , ck ,B′) V(ck ,B′)























mod q (B , C analogously)








































(M lx mod q)Hl
δ
R← D2k×n′σ2
D = Com∗ck(D; δ)
E
R← q · D2k×nσ3
ε
R← D2k×n′σ4
E = Com∗ck(E ; ε)




(M lx mod q)ηl + δ
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D̄ = (Mz mod q)D + E
δ̄ = (Mz mod q)δ + e
Rej(D̄/q, D/q,σ3, e)
Rej(δ̄, δ,σ2, e)
Rej((A‖α‖B‖β‖C‖γ), (A‖α‖B‖β‖C‖γ)− (A0‖α0‖B0‖β0‖C0‖γ0),σ1, e)
A,α, B , β, C , γ, ρ, D̄, δ̄
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→


















































(M lx mod q)Hl
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P(Ai , Bi , Ci , ck ,B) V(ck ,B)
D̄
?
= (Mz mod q)D + E
D̄
?





























2kn(1 + k + 2mkq) σ4 = 24
√
2kn(2m + 1)kq2
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